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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The continued rapid wireless technology advancement has triggered increasing popularity of
wireless communications. More types of devices are equipped with wireless functionalities, rang-
ing from embedded sensors, and handheld mobile devices, to stationary routers and desktop PCs.
These wireless-enabled devices are then interconnected to form new wireless networks and are
further deployed to fulfill varied purposes and demands. Wireless networks are favorable due to
the attractive features of relatively low cost, supported mobility, easy deployment with minimal
construction, and less reliance on infrastructural facilities.
The wide availability and desirable features of wireless technologies are facilitating many ex-
isting tasks with wireless communications and enabling new functionalities. Some of the example
scenarios where wireless networks are deployed include: in-home health care, security surveil-
lance, environment monitoring, and Internet connection. Based on different applications and net-
work configurations, the deployed wireless networks serve as information sources (wireless sensor
networks, WSN) and information gateways (wireless mesh networks, WMN). Such wide wireless
network deployment provides emerging composite networks permeated by wireless communica-
tions. The current Internet will remain and act as the “communication bus” in the emerging com-
posite wireless networks. Different wireless sensor networks are deployed to collect raw data from
widely spread locations. The collected data is then fed to the Internet which facilitates data dis-
tribution. End users acquire desired information by connecting to wireless mesh networks which
provides easy Internet access.
The content servicing architecture of emerging composite wireless networks is shown in Fig. 1.
We can identify the following three roles in the architecture.
• Content Provider (CP) deploys video sensor networks and collects raw data from all these
sensors.
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• End User (EU) requests a subset of sensor content according to individual interest.
• Service Provider (SP) acts as interface between CP and EU. SP processes the heterogeneous
sets of raw data from different CPs, decomposes and transforms them into sensor content
with a unified format. The sensor content is customized according to users’ requests. When
an EU’s request arrives, the SP parses it and responds back with a customized content subset.
Sensors
Raw
Data
Customized
Data
Contents
Response
Content Provider, CP Service Provider, SP End User, EU
Users
Query
Wireless Sensor Networks Wireless Mesh NetworksWired Internet
Figure 1: Content Service Architecture in Emerging Composite Wireless Networks.
The emerging composite wireless networks, as we can foresee, involve private personal data
in many aspects. Personal information is sensed and collected at many locations (e.g., home,
car, work), via many devices. The gathered private data is then transmitted and stored remotely.
Furthermore, end users access the collected information with different privileges, depending on his
relationship to the data requested. The ubiquitously available data in the networks is vulnerable to
privacy threats. Fig. 2 illustrates the privacy challenges that exist in emerging composite wireless
networks. How to preserve data privacy at this scale poses a big challenge. This thesis serves as a
starting point to the problem.
Data privacy can be content-wise or contextual, depending on how information is obtained
from attacker observations. Simply speaking, the content-wise privacy relates to how to answer
the question of “what is the information?”. For small scale information exchange, many classical
2
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Figure 2: Privacy Challenges in Emerging Composite Wireless Networks.
security protection approaches exist, such as encryption, authentication and access control. When
it comes to the case of large-scale massive information flow, the problem becomes hard. This
is so because current tools do not scale well and we lack a coherent scheme to handle diversified
information flow demands. Our proposal to this situation is to enable customized affordable Digital
Rights Management. Chapter II explores to enhance current Digital Rights Management (DRM)
schemes with hierarchical key generation to preserve content-wise privacy.
In contrast, contextual privacy relates to the extra information that can be inferred from obser-
vations of communication patterns. An attacker who is interested in communication patterns will
observe the amount and direction of traffic. In other words, through malicious observation, the at-
tacker will seek answers to questions like “how much information is in transmission?” and “where
is the information coming from and going to?”. By doing so, he tries to infer extra contextual
privacy information about the traffic. Such threats to contextual privacy are more problematic for
wireless networks because of the wireless broadcast communication nature.
In wired Internet, schemes like anonymous routing [51, 33] exist to preserve contextual privacy.
In wireless mesh networks and wireless sensor networks, however, contextual privacy is relatively
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new research. The relatively high traffic volume in wireless mesh networks makes it vulnerable
to volume-based traffic analysis. In Chapter III, this thesis proposes information-theoretic metric
Traffic Entropy to quantify volume-based traffic analysis. Moreover, it proposes routing control
(Penalty-based Shortest Path Routing) to route traffic through diversified random paths to address
it. Wireless sensor networks, which are “sense & aggregate” event-driven systems, however, are
subject to directional estimation of event sources. This thesis introduces Privacy Index to evaluate
privacy preservation effect and adopts an optimization-based routing protocol design to find the
optimal routing angle for directed random walk routing in Chapter IV. The thesis concludes and
points out possible future work directions in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER II
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT FOR WIRELESS NETWORKS
Wireless sensor networks are evolving from isolated systems to an integral component of the
global information infrastructure, where emerging composite wireless networks serve as the net-
working component. When sensor networks become public information sources in emerging com-
posite wireless networks and the Internet provides easy information access to numerous end users,
DRM (Digital Rights Management) must be enforced, due to the sensitivity and the privacy nature
of sensor content. Moreover, existing DRM solutions do not suffice, because the explicit one-to-
one mapping between content producer and consumer does not apply in the composite wireless
networks. In this chapter, a DRM-enabled content service architecture is proposed. For ease of
description, we use video sensor network as an example WSN when explaining the DRM scheme.
Within this architecture, we propose a binary-tree-based hierarchical key generation scheme for
data encryption, and adopt a label-guided watermarking strategy to enable content abuse trace-
back.
Introduction
Sensor networks have dramatically changed the way people interact with the physical world.
They are deployed in a physical field collaborating to perform tasks from collecting information
such as temperatures and real-time video images to locating the positions of tracking objects. In
video sensor networks [16, 39, 35], each sensor is equipped with a camera which can provide
important visual information. The content collected by sensor systems not only holds practical
value to individuals running them, but also can potentially benefit many other users. For example,
a video sensor system monitoring the garage of a shopping mall is setup for security purposes.
However, the archived video footage can become valuable material for studies on customer shop-
ping behaviors.
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When sensor network becomes a public information source on the Internet, many urgent tech-
nical issues arise, mainly due to the sensitivity and the privacy nature associated with the sensor
content. In this chapter, we argue for the necessity of enforcing DRM (Digital Rights Management)
of content servicing in emerging composite wireless networks. Here, DRM refers to a collection
of technologies used to handle the description, valuation, trading and monitoring of the rights held
over any digital entity. DRM has been proved technically sound in protecting digital work copy-
rights in movie and music industries [53]. Mature DRM systems have also been developed [38, 9].
However, many intrinsic difficulties arise when deploying existing DRM solutions into emerging
composite wireless networks.
The challenge comes from the distinguishing data characteristics of the traditional digital con-
tent and sensor content. In typical DRM applications, an explicit one-to-one mapping exists be-
tween the producer and the consumer of the digital content, such as movies and music titles. Es-
sentially a binary file, each piece of content is encrypted by a unique secret key prepared by its
producer (i.e., the owner and distributor). End users, as the content consumer, must purchase a li-
cense that contains this key, in order to enjoy the content. Furthermore, the user’s access to a piece
of content is all-or-nothing (e.g., an interested user must gain access to the movie in its entirety
and not any of its subsets).
Such a one-to-one mapping vanishes in the domain of sensor networks. First, the sensor content
is the spatial and temporal composition of data inputs from all sensors in the network. With respect
to the information provided, the data streams produced by different sensors are often co-dependent.
From the viewpoint of end users, what a meaningful piece of content (e.g., temperature in the
playground) embodies is clearly detached from how it is produced (i.e., which sensors collectively
created this result). Second, a user’s view towards the sensor content is often partial and customized
due to factors like user interest and privacy protection. For example, in home monitoring for patient
care, a video sensor network collects footage of patients within a geographical region. The care-
taker of a patient may choose to view his/her activity during a certain period of time, but is clearly
forbidden to view the footage of other patients within the same network.
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In light of these challenges, any DRM solution for the sensor network must have extreme built-
in flexibility during the collection, preparation, and access of sensor content. Furthermore, the
DRM solution needs to effectively balance the trade-off among flexibility for content management,
management overhead for content servicing, and usability for end users. We propose a DRM-
enabled content service architecture for emerging composite wireless networks. The three essential
parts of this framework are:
• Provide content decomposition for data streams to enable flexible data retrieval.
• Introduce binary-tree-based hierarchical key generation to support scalability for large-scale
communication demands in continuously growing networks.
• Service customized contents following unique labels for every request. This will allow the
Service Provider to locate the malicious user when a content breach occurs.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. II describes the major entities in the content
service architecture and presents the digital right management framework. Sec. II illustrates how
content is decomposed, using video sensor network as an example. Sec. II details the security
components in the DRM framework. Sec. II introduces the label-guided watermarking scheme to
discourage content abuse and help locate violators. Sec. II gives an overview of related work in
digital rights management. Our evaluation results obtained from preliminary testbed system are
presented in Sec. II. We provide conclusions in Sec. II.
Overall DRM Framework
Integrating the three essential parts together, the overall DRM framework is shown in Fig. 3.
The five important components of DRM that are implemented by the SP are: Content Server,
Query Server, Policy Server and License Server. The Query Server parses EU’s queries. The
Policy Server is responsible for sensor data content access control. The License Server tracks
all past and present encryption keys. It also handles license requests from the EU and records
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granted access rights of individual users. The Content Server stores watermarked and encrypted
content units and dispatches requested contents to the EU in designated ways. The Encryption/SP
Watermarking component provides security functionality like encryption, message authentication,
digital signature, license generation, and label-based watermarking. On the EU side, the DRM
Manager handles the requesting and verifying of a license and enforcing a digital rights check.
The Decryption component decrypts contents for the Content Player to feed playback to EU. The
CP owns deployed sensors and collects raw data from those sensors and supplies to to SP.
Decryption
Component
Content
Player
Manager
DRM
End User
S1
S2
Si
Sn
.
.
.
.
.
.
Content
Server Server
Query
Server
Policy
Server
License
Encryption
Watermarking
Service Provider
.
.
.
.
.
.
Content Provider
Figure 3: Digital Rights Management in Emerging Composite Wireless Networks
Our framework is viable under several attack scenarios. For typical eavesdropping attacks,
even if an attacker can intercept the video contents sent to an EU A, he can not possibly acquire all
necessary keys to decrypt them. Furthermore, illegal distribution is countered as well. Any valid
EU A is identified by a unique UserIDA, which relates to his binary identification key. In case of
a content breach by B, the breach string will identify him. Sec. II explains these aspects in more
detail.
Composite Wireless Networks Content Decomposition
From Fig. 1, we identify three entities, CP, SP and EU in emerging composite wireless net-
works content servicing architecture. In this section, we present a decomposition of sensor content
in emerging composite wireless networks and how this is collectively done by the three entities.
The flow of sensor content, from its creation and collection, to its distribution, is outlined in Fig. 1.
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Defining an interface to map between the raw sensor data and the content customizable by
the end user is the main purpose to implement this service architecture. The main challenge, as
described in the introduction, comes from the reality that the explicit one-to-one mapping between
the content producer and consumer in traditional DRM applications does not apply for the domain
of sensor networks.
We start with the raw image data/video data collected by the video sensors. Let Si (i =
1, 2, ..., N ) be one of the N video sensors in the network. The data content is provided by Si
as a content stream ConStreami across a three dimensional domain (one dimension in temporal
domain and two dimensions in spatial domain). In the temporal domain ti, ConStreami consists
of a series of content items (ConItemi(t), t ∈ [t1i , t2i ]). In the spatial domain, each ConItemi(t)
(or video frame) is decomposed into small content units (ConUnitji (t), j = 1, 2, . . .), which are
the smallest content units to respond to user-specific queries. A ConUnit is part of a video frame
and is the smallest element for encryption at the content server of CP . A choice of encryption at
this granularity serves two purposes: to save only useful information and to support customization
of EUs. The relationship of these three units is illustrated in Fig. 4. Mathematically, we have
ConUnitji (t) ∈ ConItemi(t), ConItemi(t) ∈ ConStreami and
⋃
i∈[1,N ] ConStreami consti-
tutes the whole set of content provided by CP .
ConItem ConUnit
ConStream
Content Decomposition
Server
Content
Si
Target
Figure 4: Sensor Content Decomposition
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From a user’s perspective, the unit of interested content is defined as a target. In a video sensor
network, a target may be a home, a highway, a garage, etc. When an EU requests the desired
target from a sensor content service, he/she will submit a profile of the target which may include
its identity, position, size, and time interval of the request. Based on the profile, the SP maps the
target into a set of content units, which collectively embody this target. The set of content units are
then delivered to the EU.
For example, a target’s profile can be denoted as {ID =“BankFrontDoor”, POS = (5, 7),
SIZE = (9, 15), T IME = [100s, 120s]}. This maps to a set of images Imgi(t) with region size
9 by 15 (in pixels) at position (5,7) during time t, 100s ≤ t ≤ 120s.
Hierarchical Key Management and Data Encryption
When accessing customized content from emerging composite wireless networks, the user re-
quests can be highly heterogeneous across spatial and temporal domains, at varying granularity. In
our content service architecture, some requests may only involve a handful of decomposed content
units, while others may cover thousands of them. Obviously, it is not realistic to find a one-size-
fits-all solution by looking for the right size of the content unit. To address this challenge, we
present a tree based hierarchical key management and encryption scheme for data encryption in
this section.
Key Generation
The design goal of key management at the SP is to support a scalable data encryption solution
that is adaptive to highly heterogeneous sensor content requests. The basic idea is to generate a
hierarchical key structure corresponding to the content item structure. The keys at the lower level of
the hierarchy could be generated from the keys at the higher level. For each content unit (ConUnit
– the smallest unit that corresponds to users’ requests), the keys at the lowest level (leaf keys) are
used for encryption. When a content stream (ConStream) that consists of multiple ConUnits is
requested, instead of providing all the leaf keys that encrypt these ConUnits to the end user, only
the keys which constitute the minimum cover of these keys in the tree hierarchy are provided.
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Specifically, the CP and SP first reach an agreement aboutMasterKeyP , a common provider’s
master key. ThisMasterKeyP is the highest-level key in the hierarchy and is used throughout their
sensor network content provision contract. For every sensor Si, SP generates a sensor master key
MasterKeyi using a hash function with Si’s profile and the provider’s master key as input. All
MasterKeyis are updated on a regular basis.
MasterKeyi = HASH(SensorProfilei||MasterKeyP ) (1)
MasterKeyP
MasterKey0
Key01
MasterKeyi .. Sensor Master Key
Service Provider Master Key
Intermediate 
Keys
Key012
.. .. ConUnitKey i112
Intermediate
Keys
Key02 Keyi 1 Keyi 2
Key011 Key021 Key022 Keyi 11 Keyi 12 Keyi 21 Keyi 22
Leaf/Content
KeysConUnitKey 0
111 ConUnitKey i222
Figure 5: Hierarchical Key Generation
For each sensor Si, its MasterKeyi is used to generate content unit keys (ConUnitKeyji , j =
1, 2, . . .) through a tree-based key hierarchy as shown in Fig. 5. At each level k, we associate
intermediate keys with the root node Key0i = MasterKeyi. The leaf nodes provide content unit
keys ConUnitKeyji .
Key
(k−1)||l
i = HASH(l||Keyk−1i ) (2)
Here, l represents the “tree node position” which could be a time range, or the region position
of the image. At time t, the content unit (ConUnitji (t)) will be encrypted with the content unit
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key (ConUnitKeyji ) corresponding to the leaf node. The License Server in SP keeps a log of all
master, intermediate and content keys ever generated and used within the DRM system.
Encryption
Note that when the sensor content moves from CP to SP, they are encrypted by link-level
protocols like TinySec. At the SP, sensor content is decomposed into content units and further
encrypted by its corresponding content keys with conventional symmetric ciphers. Upon end users’
requests, content units of targets resulting from decomposition of the EU request will be delivered
encrypted.
The same ConUnits of ConStreami from one sensor Si will be encrypted with one single
key for a certain period, as described in the key generation step. Hence, a potential adversary
possessing access privileges to one target content cannot decipher other unlawfully acquired target
contents, even if they are all from the same sensor source. The periodically updating characteristic
of encryption key of the same target ensures that a user is granted only limited time length access
rights to his desired target. To be able to access content over a larger time domain, the EU needs
to request appropriate access rights through multiple licenses.
Access Control
Digital right management enables the sensor data content to be delivered to end users via di-
verse, non-secure communication channels. To actually playback the received encrypted contents,
the EU will need to authenticate himself and request appropriate access rights for the sensor con-
tents. To do so, the EU will request a license from the SP. In his request, the EU will indicate
for what content and time interval he is requesting a license. Also included will be his personal
information (e.g. unique ID or credit card number, if payment is necessary).
After user authentication, the SP will verify his access rights to the requested sensor content
units and generate a license. The license includes all the keys (intermediate and content keys
as will be detailed soon) required to decrypt the contents. In our tree-based key hierarchy, this
corresponds to a minimum cover of all the leaf keys that correspond to the content units requested
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by the user. As illustrated in Fig. 5, if the EU requests all content units as marked in a rectangle,
then instead of returning all keys associated with each unit, the SP only needs to return the keys of
the shadowed nodes, which are MasterKey0 and Key11i . From the key generation procedure, it is
obvious that the user is able to derive all content keys required to decrypt the content he requested.
To protect the confidentiality and integrity of the license, the license is signed with the SP’s private
key from the License Server and encrypted via the EU’s public key.
Our hierarchical key management solution scales well to user requests for large volume con-
tents. It reduces the overhead and complexity involved in communicating the keys to the end users.
At the same time it is also flexible enough to meet the diverse user requests for sensor content with
different sizes (i.e., number of content units). For a binary hierarchical key tree, the key hierarchy
doubles the key space that the SP needs to manage, in comparison with a flat key management so-
lution where content unit keys are organized in a flat way. This is so because in a complete binary
tree the number of leaf nodes is half that of the total number of nodes. Yet as SP usually resides on
powerful servers, such increase in key space would not significantly affect the performance of our
DRM framework for video sensor content service.
Legal EU-Sensor Content Association
Watermarking [42, 19] is the process of embedding data into a multimedia content such as
image, audio and video. The embedded information, called a watermark, can be extracted later
on for security reasons. In our DRM framework, digital watermarking of the generated sensor
content at the CP and the SP is used to (1) protect the rightful ownership of the CP and the SP; (2)
discourage the EUs from abusing their digital rights and enable the CP and the SP to trace illegal
sensor content distributions and identify violators.
In particular, the SP prepares a composed sensor content consisting of individual sensor content
units, desired and requested by the EU. First, the CP and the SP generates DRM-safe sensor
content, where each sensor content unit carries the hierarchical watermark consisting of CP and
SP rightful ownership information. However, this composed watermark is not sufficient to create
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a sensor content stream that would be unambiguous for different EUs. To address this issue,
we present a third watermarking process laid over sensor content – label-guided watermarking
scheme, which is able to provide efficient yet powerful digital watermarking for unambiguous and
legal sensor content association with an EU.
The label-guided watermarking scheme has the following steps: First, the SP chooses two wa-
termarks W0 and W1. Let Sj = (Sj1, ..., Sjn) be the composed sensor content stream prepared for an
EU j. As the next step, the SP copies the stream Sj to create Sj′ stream and watermarks the sensor
content stream Sj with watermark W0 and stream Sj
′
with watermark W1. Then the SP generates
a unique EU/customer label in the form of a binary identification key b (e.g., 01101010100). Such
a label is generated by a hash function based on the information in the user’s request (e.g., user’s
ID, query content, time stamp)
b = HASH(UserID||UserQuery||TimeStamp) (3)
This generated label string is used to determine which watermark each outgoing content unit
should have. Finally, a watermarked composed sensor content stream Sjfinal which is unique to the
EU is generated as follows.
• If the identification key binary digit is 0, then a sensor content unit from the stream Sj
watermarked with watermark W0 is selected;
• If the identification key binary digit is 1, content unit from Sj′ with watermarkW1 is selected.
This implies that the generated label string is able to determine which watermark each outgoing
content unit should have1. That is, depending on if bk is 0 or 1, the kth content unit has watermark
W0 or W1. In this way, the combination of two different watermarks in content units reveals the
source (one content service at a particular time to a particular user) of leaked digital contents. The
process of label guided content service is shown in Fig. 6. If the number of content units in a
1Assume that all ConUnitji (t)s are totally ordered.
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single request exceeds |b|, the label is scanned from left to right repeatedly until all content units
are dispatched.
For example, let us assume
S = (ContentW0S1 , Content
W0
S2
, ContentW0S3 , Content
W0
S4
),
Scopy = (Content
W1
S1
, ContentW1S2 , Content
W1
S3
, ContentW1S4 )
and the content units are coarsely partitioned at the level of different sensor information (note that
the granularity in reality is much finer, going into small ConUnitji units). If the EU identification
key is 0110, then the resulting sensor content stream for the EU is
Sfinal = (Content
W0
S1
, ContentW1S2 , Content
W1
S3
, ContentW0S4 ).
Original ConUnits
ConUnits with W0 ConUnits with W1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
Label String of Customer A Label String of Customer B
Figure 6: Label-Guided Content Servicing
Utilizing the label-based watermarking we are able to study the attacks, collusion possibilities
among EUs, and leaking actions. Due to the fact that a single content unit, or a small collection
of content units (say, less than |b|) are meaningless, and that locating such small-scale actions
are extremely difficult, we assume a content breach action to be one that leaks out at least |b|
content units. Suppose a subset of m content units are breached, and a series of bits (0, 1) denote
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whether each content unit is watermarked with W0 or W1. We can arrange these bits into a unique
Breach String BStr of binary bits b1, b2, . . . , bm following their corresponding ConUnits’ order.
By inspecting BStr, we can identify a repeating substring subBStr of length |b|. This subBStr
will uniquely identify the leaker.
Experimental Results
Testbed Setup
We build our testbed system on a Linux system (Dell Precision 670, dual-core, 2GB RAM). We
prepared a set of webcam images (average size 225KB) to simulate the video sensor content. These
images have a unified resolution of 320 x 240. Each image is split into several ImgRegs, each
representing a target. Every ImgReg is duplicated to two copies, watermarked with different keys.
A unique encryption key is generated separately for each ImgReg. In the preliminary experiments
reported in this thesis, we evaluate the average performance of watermarking, encryption, and
decryption on each ImgReg.
Our watermarking experiment uses the watermarking scheme provided by the Digital Invisible
Ink Toolkit (DIIT)[2]. The encryption experiment is built upon the Java security library. Further-
more, we rely on the Message Digest feature to produce a unique encryption key for each target.
The encryption algorithms we choose are DES and RC4.
Fig. 7 illustrates the flow of our experiments. Fig. 7 (a) shows a webcam image of the en-
gineering campus of Vanderbilt University. The original image is then split into four ImgRegs,
with each watermarked individually. Fig. 7 (b) shows the watermark results of the bottom two
ImgRegs. The same ImgRegs after encryption are shown in Fig. 7 (c). Finally, in Fig. 7 (d), we
show client-side result of a user interested in solely monitoring the Small Molecule NMR Facility
Core, which is the round building shown in the lower left ImgReg of the original image. While
this ImgReg is decrypted by acquiring the corresponding decryption key, the remaining ImgReg
remains encrypted from the viewer.
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(a) Original Image (b) Watermarked Images (c) Encrypted Images (d) Decrypted Images
Figure 7: Comparison of Original, Watermarked, Encrypted and Decrypted Images
Evaluation Results
Watermark Size Effect
Fig. 8 (a) demonstrates the time overhead of watermarking on the same image using water-
marks of different sizes. For horizontal axis, we show the ratio of watermark size to MaxBytes,
the maximum bytes that can be hidden in an image. According to DIIT[2]:
MaxBytes = (ImageHeight× ImageWidth× Color Numbers× Number of Bits to Hide)/8.
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Figure 8: Watermarking Time Cost with Different Message Sizes.
As shown in the picture, the time overhead does not grow linearly as a function of the message
size. This is because as the ratio becomes larger, it takes the watermarking program longer time to
find the free space and hide the information.
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Fig. 8 (b) compares results of watermarking two images of different sizes using the same set
of watermarks. The smaller image is 6.9KB, and the larger one is 20.8KB. The sizes of messages
range from 1KB to 24KB. In the picture, the two curves are almost overlapped. Although the large
image does take longer time than the smaller one, the difference is trivial. Combined with the
results in Fig. 8 (a), the size of the watermarks has greater impact than the size of the image.
Key Generation Performance
We test the time to create a finite number of keys. The results show that it takes 150ms to create
100 keys but takes only about 450ms to create 10,000 keys. Since we run the key creation function
repeatedly, and did not save the created keys into the storage system, the results may be optimistic.
But even for 150ms/100 keys, it can still support a system with a large key number requirement.
Related Work
Our work relies on extensive prior work in Digital Rights Management (DRM) in distributed
multimedia systems and research results in several areas including watermarking encryption algo-
rithms and security protocols. Major players in Internet-based multimedia have adopted DRM into
their mainstream products. Windows Media DRM [9] is a flexible platform that makes it possible
to protect and securely deliver content by subscription or by individual request. Developed by Re-
alNetworks, Helix DRM [4] is a comprehensive and flexible platform for the secure media content
delivery of standards-based as well as leading Internet formats, including RealAudio, RealVideo,
MP3, MPEG-4, AAC, and H.263. Both solutions provide secure media packaging, license gener-
ation, and content delivery to a trusted media player on a computer, portable device, or network
device. DRM has also been applied in preserving the privacy of user context information in ubiq-
uitous computing environment [25]. However, none of the existing DRM solutions are applicable
to protect the video sensor content due to the challenges we have presented. In [50, 41], two hi-
erarchical access control and key management frameworks are presented. Our work is different
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from [50, 41] in that we consider the unique temporal and spatial diversity characteristics of video
sensor contents.
Security for wireless sensor networks has been extensively studied in the existing literature,
which includes link layer security [31], broadcast authentication [44], and key management [24].
Concerned to the security issues involved with the emergence of sensor networks, the existing re-
search has focused on protecting the information within sensor networks. Our work mainly focuses
on preserving the privacy and economical value of the sensor information when it is delivered from
sensor networks to the Internet.
Conclusion
Digital right management is a critical component to enable the vision of sensor-centric global
information infrastructure. This paper presents the architecture and the enabling security mecha-
nisms of digital right management for video sensor networks. Novel key management scheme is
presented to address the unique challenge of video sensor data content distribution. Initial testbed
results show that our proposed solution is sound and efficient. We will expand our experiment
from single images to continuous streams as future work.
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CHAPTER III
PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS
Multi-hop wireless mesh networks (WMN) have attracted increasing attention and deployment
as a low-cost approach to provide last-mile broadband Internet access. Privacy is a critical issue in
WMN, as traffic of an end user is relayed via multiple wireless mesh routers. Due to the unique
characteristics of WMN, the existing privacy solutions applied in the Internet are either ineffective
at preserving privacy of WMN users, or will cause severe performance degradation.
In this chapter, we propose a light-weight privacy preserving solution aimed to achieve a well-
maintained balance between network performance and traffic privacy preservation. At the center
of this solution is a novel metric called “traffic entropy”, which quantifies the amount of informa-
tion required to describe the traffic pattern and to characterize the performance of traffic privacy
preservation. We further present a penalty-based shortest path routing algorithm that maximally
preserves traffic privacy by minimizing the mutual information of “traffic entropy” observed at
each individual relaying node, meanwhile controlling performance degradation within the accept-
able region. Extensive simulation evidence indicates the soundness of our solution.
Our solution is further tested in the case of collusion of two malicious observers. Simulation
results show our approach is resilient to two colluding observers.
Introduction
Recently, multi-hop wireless mesh networks (WMN) are being deployed as a low-cost substi-
tute approach to provide “last-mile” broadband Internet access [5, 7, 8, 6]. In a WMN, each client
accesses a stationary wireless mesh router. Multiple mesh routers communicate with one another
to form a multi-hop wireless backbone that forwards user traffic to a few gateways connected to the
Internet. Some perceived benefits of WMN include enhanced resilience against node failures and
channel errors, high data rates, and low costs in deployment and maintenance. For such reasons,
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commercial WMNs are already deployed in some US cities (e.g., Medford, Oregon). Even large
cities are planning to deploy city-wide WMNs as well [1].
However, to further widen the deployment of WMN, and enable them as competitive players
in the market of broadband Internet access, privacy issues must be addressed. Privacy has been a
major concern of Internet users [17]. It is a particularly critical issue in the context of WMN-based
Internet access, where users’ traffic is forwarded via multiple mesh routers. In a community mesh
network, this means that the traffic of a residence can be observed by the mesh routers residing at its
neighbors. Despite the necessity, limited research has been conducted towards privacy preservation
in WMN.
This motivates us to investigate the privacy preserving mechanism in WMN. There are two
primary privacy issues – data confidentiality and traffic confidentiality.
• Data confidentiality. Data content reveals user privacy on what is communicated. Data
confidentiality aims to protect the data content and prevent eavesdropping by intermediate
mesh routers. Message encryption is a conventional approach for data confidentiality.
• Traffic confidentiality. Traffic information (e.g., who the users are communicating with,
when and how frequently they communicate, the amount and the pattern of traffic) also
reveals critical privacy information. The broadcasting nature of wireless communication
makes acquiring such information easy. In a WMN, attackers can conduct traffic analysis at
mesh routers by simply listening to the channels to identify the “ups and downs” of target’s
traffic. While data confidentiality can be achieved via message encryption, it is harder to
preserve traffic confidentiality. In this chapter we focus on the user traffic confidentiality
issue, and study the problem of traffic pattern concealment.
We aim at designing a light-weight privacy preserving mechanism for WMN which is able to
balance the traffic analysis resistance and the bandwidth cost. Our mechanism makes use of the
intrinsic redundancy of WMN, which is able to provide multiple paths for data delivery. Intuitively,
if the traffic from the source (i.e., gateway) to the destination (i.e., mesh router) is split among
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many paths, then all the relaying nodes 1 along the paths can only observe a portion of the entire
traffic. Moreover, if the traffic is split in a random way, both spatially and temporally, then an
intermediate node has limited knowledge to figure out the overall traffic pattern. Thus the traffic
pattern is concealed.
Based on this intuition, we seek a routing scheme which routes data such that the statistical
distributions of the traffic observed at intermediate relaying nodes are independent from the actual
traffic from the source to the destination. To achieve this goal, we first define an information-
theoretic metric – “traffic entropy”, which quantifies the amount of information required to describe
the traffic pattern. Then we present a penalty-based routing algorithm, which aims to minimize the
mutual information of “traffic entropy” observed at each relaying node, meanwhile controlling the
network performance degradation to an acceptable level.
Considering the possibility of collusion, we evaluate our scheme under situation when two ob-
servers exchange their knowledge about the same destination. We measure this shared knowledge
as “colluded traffic mutual information” and our simulation results show that our scheme is still
viable in case of two colluding eavesdroppers.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section III, we present the overall archi-
tecture for privacy preservation in WMN. Sections III and III focus on the traffic privacy issue. In
particular, Section III presents a model to quantify the performance of traffic privacy preservation,
and Section III presents a routing algorithm. The proposed privacy preserving solution is evalu-
ated via extensive simulation in Section III. Section III discusses possible collusion problems with
malicious traffic observers and its impact on our proposed scheme. Section III summarizes back-
ground knowledge and related work. Section III concludes the chapter and points out the future
directions.
1In this thesis, we use the following terms interchangeably: wireless mesh router, intermediate relaying node,
wireless node.
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Privacy Preserving Architecture
We consider a multi-hop WMN shown in Fig. 9. In this network, client devices access a
stationary wireless mesh router at its residence. Multiple mesh routers communicate with one
another to form a multi-hop wireless backbone that forwards user traffic to the gateway which is
connected to the Internet.
Internet
Gateway g
KUg, KRg
KUi, for all mesh router i 
Client Device
Mesh Router i
KUi, KRi, KUg
(g,a,b,c,e,i) s, d 
Client d
source route encrypted packet

higher layer data
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c
e
s
Figure 9: Privacy Preserving Architecture for Wireless Mesh Network.
Two privacy aspects are considered in this architecture. Data confidentiality aims to protect the
data content from eavesdropping by the intermediate mesh routers. Traffic confidentiality prevents
a traffic analysis attack from the mesh routers, which aims at deducing the traffic information
such as who the user is communicating with, the amount, and the pattern of traffic. Our privacy
preserving architecture aims to protect the privacy of each wireless mesh router, the basic routing
unit in WMN. The architecture consists of the following functional components.
• Key Distribution. In this architecture, each mesh node, as well as the gateway, has a pair of
public and private keys (KU,KR). The gateway maintains a directory of certified public
keys of all mesh nodes. Each mesh node has a copy of the public key, KUg,of the gateway.
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The public key KUi of mesh node i and KUg are used to establish the shared secret session
key KSgi, which is used to encrypt the messages between them.
• Message Encryption. Let M be the IP packet sent from a source s in the Internet to a client
d in the mesh network, and i be the mesh router of client d. The IP packet M , which
contains the original source and destination address s and d, is encrypted at gateway g via
the shared secret key KSgi: Me = E(KSgi,M). To route the encrypted packet Me to its
destination, the gateway prefixes to the packet the source route from the gateway g to the
router i. The encapsulated packet is then forwarded by relaying routers in WMN. Likewise,
packets traveled in the reversed direction are treated the same way. As the source address
s and other higher layer header information (e.g., port, ID), are all encrypted, the relaying
routers are unable to obtain the information on who the client of router i is communicating
with, and what type of application is involved. Since encryption and decryption take place
only at the gateway and the destination mesh router, much less computation is required,
which is a desired feature in WMN.
• Routing Control. With the source route in clear text in an encapsulated packet, the interme-
diate mesh routers can still observe the amount and the pattern of the traffic of a particular
mesh node i. To address this problem, our privacy preserving mechanism explores the path
diversity of WMN, and forwards packets between the gateway and the mesh node via differ-
ent routes. Thus, any relaying router can only observe a portion of the whole traffic of this
connection. In Section III, we detail the design of a penalty-based routing algorithm, which
randomly selects a route for each individual packet such that the observed traffic pattern at
each relaying node is independent of the overall traffic. The residential networks are gener-
ally small in size. Therefore, in our design, the gateway maintains a complete topology of
the WMN, and computes the source routes between the destination mesh nodes and itself.
24
Privacy Modelling in WMN
Network Model
We model the WMN shown in Fig. 9 as a graph G = {V , E}, where V is the set of wireless
nodes in WMN, and E is the set of wireless edges (x, y) between any two nodes x, y. Each node
x maintains a logical connection with the gateway node g. Node x receives data from the Internet
via g. The source and destination information of a packet is open to the relaying node. The
traffic pattern of x can be categorized into two types: incoming traffic patterns and outgoing traffic
patterns. In this paper, we concentrate on the first type.
If the traffic between g and x goes through only one route, then any relaying node on this route
can easily observe the entire traffic between g and x, thus violating its traffic pattern privacy. To
avoid this problem, x must establish multiple paths with g and distribute its traffic along these
paths, such that any node can only reconstruct a partial picture of x’s traffic pattern.
Time
Traffic Volume
Total Traffic of x
Traffic routed through a path
Figure 10: An Example of Isomorphic Traffic
However, the complete traffic pattern information of x could still be obtained by a single node
in case of multi-path routing. In the example shown by Fig. 10, g allocates the traffic to x via two
disjoint routes by fixed proportion. Then, for any node along any path, although only seeing one
half of the flow, the observed traffic shape is isomorphic to the original one. Therefore, the traffic
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to x must be distributed along multiple route in a time-variant fashion, such that the traffic pattern
observed at any node is statistically different from the original pattern.
Traffic Entropy
We propose to use information entropy as a metric to quantify the performance of a solution at
preserving the traffic pattern confidentiality. In what follows, we consider two nodes x and y. x is
the destination node of the traffic from the gateway g to x. y is the observing node, which relays
packets to x and also tries to analyze the traffic of x.
Time
Traffic Volume
……
Total Traffic of x
Figure 11: Sampling-based Traffic Analysis
Table 1: Notations used in Sec. III
V wireless node set
E edge set
g gateway node
x destination node
y observing node
X random variable describing x’s traffic pattern
Y X random variable describing x’s traffic pattern observed by y
H(X) entropy of X
H(Y X) entropy of Y X
I(Y X , X) mutual information between X and Y X
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Basic Definition
Ideally, we view the traffic of x as a continuous function of time, as shown in Fig. 11. In
practice, the traffic analysis is conducted by dividing time into equal-sized sampling periods, then
measuring the amount of traffic in each period, usually in terms of number of packets, assuming
the packet sizes are all equal. Therefore, as the first step, we discretize the continuous traffic curve
into a piece-wise approximation of discrete values, each denoting the number of packets destined
to x in a sampling period.
Now, we use X as the random variable of this discrete value. Y X is the random variable
representing the number of packets destined to x observed at node y in a sampling period. We
denote P (X = i) as the probability that the random variable X is equal to i (i ∈ N ) (i.e., the
probability that node x receives i packets in a sampling period). Likewise, P (Y X = j) is the
probability that Y X is equal to j (j ∈ N ), i.e., j packets destined to x go through node y in a
sampling period.
Then the discrete Shannon entropy of the discrete random variable X is
H(X) = −
∑
i
P (X = i) log2 P (X = i) (4)
H(X) is a measurement of the uncertainty about outcome of X . In other words, it measures the
information of node x’s traffic (i.e., the number of bits required to code the values of X). H(X)
takes its maximum value when the value of X is uniformly distributed. On the other hand, if
the traffic pattern is CBR (constant bit rate), then H(X) = 0 since the number of packets at any
sampling period is fixed2. Similarly, we have the entropy for Y X as follows.
H(Y X) = −
∑
j
P (Y X = j) log2 P (Y
X = j) (5)
2This offers the information-theoretic interpretation for traffic padding: by flattening the traffic curve with blank
packets, the entropy of observable traffic is reduced to 0, which perfectly hides the information of the original traffic
pattern.
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Mutual Information
We define the conditional entropy of random variable X with respect to Y X as
H(X|Y X) = −
∑
j
P (Y X = j)
∑
i
pij log2 pij (6)
where pij = P (X = i|Y X = j) is the probability that X = i given condition that Y X = j.
H(X|Y X) can be thought of as the uncertainty remaining about X after Y X is known. The joint
entropy of X and Y X can be shown as
H(X,Y X) = H(Y X) +H(X|Y X) (7)
Finally, we define the mutual information between X and Y X as
I(Y X , X) = H(X) +H(Y X)−H(X,Y X)
= H(X)−H(X|Y X) (8)
which represents the information we gain about X from Y X .
Returning to the example in Fig. 10, let us assume that the observing node y is located on one
route destined to x. Since the traffic shape observed at y is the same as x, at any sampling period,
if Y X = j, then X must be equal to a fixed value i, making P (X = i|Y X = j) = 1. According
to Eq. (6), this makes the conditional entropy H(X|Y X) = 0. According to Eq. (8), we have
I(Y X , X) = H(X), implying that from Y X , we gain the complete information about X .
On the contrary, if Y X is independent fromX , then the conditional probability P (X = i|Y X =
j) = P (X = i), which maximizes the conditional entropy H(X|Y X) to H(X). According to
Eq. (8), we have I(Y X , X) = 0,3 (i.e., we gain no information about X from Y X).
3By the definition of mutual information, I(Y X ,X) ≥ 0, with equality if and only if X and Y are independent.
28
In reality, since Y X records the number of a subset of packets destined to node x, it can not
be totally independent from the random variable X . Therefore, the mutual information should be
valued between the two extremes discussed above (i.e., 0 < I(Y X , X) < H(X)). This means that
node y can still obtain partial information of X’s traffic pattern. However, a good routing solution
should minimize such mutual information as much as possible for any potential observing node.
More formally, we should minimize
max
Y ∈V−X
I(Y X , X) (9)
the maximum mutual information that any node can obtain about X .
Penalty-based Routing Algorithm
In this section, we propose a penalty-based routing algorithm to achieve our goal of hiding traf-
fic patterns by exploiting the richness of available paths between two nodes in WMN. Specifically,
we choose to adopt the source routing scheme. Such a choice is enabled by the fact that one node
can easily acquire the topology of the WMN it belongs to, which is mid-sized (within 100 nodes)
and static.
When designing the algorithm, we also keep in mind the need to compromise between suffi-
cient security assurance and acceptable system overhead. We show in our algorithm that system
performance is satisfactory and security assurance is adequate. Shown in Tab. 2, the algorithm
operates in three phases, path pool generation, candidate path selection and individual packet
routing. The notations used in Sec. III are listed in Tab. 3.
First, in the path pool generation phase, we generate a large set of diversified routing paths
connecting the gateway g and the destination node x, denoted as Spaths. The path generation algo-
rithm is an iterative process of applying PBSP (Penalty-Based Shortest Path), a modified version
of Dijkstra’s algorithm. The PBSP algorithm is shown in the first part of Tab. 2. Here, each node is
assigned a penalty weight, and the weight of an edge is defined as the weighted average of penalty
weights of its two end nodes. The weight (or cost) of a path is defined as the sum of penalty weights
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of all edges constituting this path. The algorithm runs in iterations. Initially, we set the penalty
weight of each node as 1, then run the Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the first shortest path from the
gateway g to x. Next, we increase the penalty weight for each node on this found path. This will
make these appeared nodes less competitive to other nodes in becoming components of the next
path. After this, the algorithm proceeds to the next iteration, generating the second path, and all
nodes appearing on the second path are penalized through increasing their weights. This process
iterates until a sufficient number of paths are found. Second, in the candidate path selection phase,
we try to choose a combination of diversified routing paths, a subset of paths from the set Spaths ,
denoted as Sselected. The paths in Sselected are selected randomly from Spaths. After each choice of
a path is placed into Sselected, the probability factor of that path is decreased to lower the chance
of multiple identical paths existing in Sselected. Sselected is changed and renewed corresponding to
network activities. Third, in the packet routing phase, we choose randomly from Sselected one path
for each packet and increase the counter for the selected path subset Sselected. This Sselected path
subset expires after a counter reaches its predetermined threshold. Then Sselected is renewed by
calling the second phase again.
Since packets are assigned a randomly chosen path, and all these candidate paths are designed
to be disjoint, the chance that packets are routed in similar paths is small. Our experimental results
confirm this intuition. This algorithm is designed to balance the needs of routing performance
(finding paths with smallest hop count) and preserving traffic pattern privacy (finding disjoint
paths). The penalty weight update function serves as the tuning knob to maneuver the algorithm
between these two contradictory goals. During the initialization, when the penalties of all nodes
are equal, the path found by the algorithm is indeed the shortest in terms of hop count. As a node
is chosen by more routes, its penalty weight monotonically increases, making it less likely to be
chosen again. Thus, as the algorithm proceeds, the newly-chosen paths (shortest in terms of its
aggregate penalty weight) become more disjoint from existing paths, but longer in terms of hop
count. The pace of such shift from “smallest hop-count path” to “disjoint path” is controlled by
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how fast the penalty weight update function grows. Our experimental results confirm this rea-
soning. Finally, by randomly assigning packets along different paths, the algorithm maximally
disturbs the traffic pattern of any g − x pair.
Although penalty-based routing has been used in existing literature [12], we are using it for
different objects. Their links were penalized for losses or malicious behavior while our approach
applies it to avoid using links repeatedly to get better path diversity.
Experimental Results
Simulation Setup
We base our simulations on a randomly generated topology (Fig. 12) (600 x 600) with 30
nodes. The effective distance between two nodes is set to be 250. The whole process of simulation
consists of 400,000 logical ticks. In each single tick, a packet is generated at gateway node 0 and
its destination is randomly decided to be one of the other 29 nodes. To better simulate real network
traffic, we set the probability of 0.05 that at one tick no packet is generated (i.e., idle probability).
The distance delay factor is chosen to be 0.003 tick and the hop delay factor is decided as 0.05 tick.
We approximate hop delay at any node by multiplying the hop delay factor with its usage count by
all paths chosen initially.
With a relatively small node set, we choose 50 as our PathPoolSize and 5 as SelPathNum.
The selected path subset Sselected for any destination node is renewed after sending 50 packets
to that node. To obtain multiple diversified paths with Dijkstra’s algorithm more quickly, we
introduce an exponential penalty function on tag of one node and used γ as the parameter of an
exponential function when deciding on which edge to include in a candidate path. To slow down
the growing rate of exponential penalty function, we multiply the exponential function with a factor
α when calculating EdgePenalty. To avoid getting too many identically paths in the beginning
stages, we amplify the influence of another node by multiplying tag of another node with β. The
penalty parameters α, β, γ are chosen to be 0.5, 15, and 1.85, respectively.
31
Table 2: Penalty-based Routing Algorithm
/*Penalty-Based Shortest Path*/
PBSP (Snode,Dnode)
For each node v ∈ V
d[v]←∞
prev[v]←∞
visited[v]← 0
d[SNode]← 0
Repeat
Get unvisited vertex v with the least d[v]
If d[v] ≥ ∞, Then v unreachable
Else visited[v]← 1
For all v’s neighbors w
EdgePenalty = α[pow(γ, (w.tag))] + β(v.tag)
If d[w] > d[v] + EdgePenalty
d[w]← d[v] + EdgePenalty
prev[w]← v
Until visited[v] = 1, ∀v ∈ V
/*Generate Spaths for each g − x pair*/
GenPath()
For all non-gateway nodes x
For each node v ∈ V
v.tag ← 1
Repeat
PBSP(g, x)
Get new g − x path Pnew from vector prev[]
Store Pnew in Spaths
For all nodes v on Pnew
v.tag ← v.tag + 1
Until PathPoolSize paths found.
/*Select Sselected for each g − x pair*/
SelPath()
Repeat
rnd = rand() mod PathPoolSize
select rndth path from Spaths
Until SelPathNum paths selected
/*Decide path for arriving packet*/
RoutePkt(Snode,Dnode)
Packets[Dnode]← Packets[Dnode] + 1
rndpath = rand() mod SelPathNum
route packet along the rndpathth path from Sselected
If Packets[Dnode] > ReSelPathCnt
Packets[Dnode]← 0
SelPath()
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Table 3: Notations used in Sec. III
v, w node
v.tag number of times v is included by a path
α factor to slow down penalty rate
β factor to avoid many identical paths in the beginning stages of path gen-
eration
γ base of exponential penalty function
d[] penalty vector for every node
prev[] vector to store Pnew in reverse order
Packets[] vector to store the number of arrived packets for every node
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Traffic Entropy and Mutual Information
The total 400,000 ticks are divided into 20 periods. Each period is then divided into 50 intervals
and one interval is 400 ticks long. Within each interval, for each destination node x, we count the
number of packets that all other nodes y have relayed for x. Then for each period, we independently
calculate the traffic entropies H(X), H(Y X), and mutual information I(Y X , X) based on their
definitions in Sec. III.
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(a) Destination: Node 1, Observer: Node 23 (b) Destination: Node 16, Observer: Node 9
Figure 13: Traffic Entropy along Time (Single Observer, γ = 1.85)
Due to the space limit, we only show part of our results. Among all nodes in the network,
we choose two sets of nodes. Nodes in the first set {1, 6, 11, 15, 23, 24, 25, 29} are close to (2 to
3 hops) the gateway node 0. Nodes in the second set {2, 3, 7, 16, 17, 28} are at the edge of the
network, 4 to 5 hops away from the gateway. We choose two representative nodes, 1 and 16, out
of each set.
Fig. 13 shows the variance of traffic entropy and mutual information as a function of the time.
In Fig. 13 (a), H(1−1) denotes the traffic entropy of node 1. H(23−1) denotes the traffic entropy
of node 23 based on its observation on node 1. MI(23− 1, 1− 1) denotes the mutual information
that node 23 shares with node 1. The same notation rules apply for Fig. 13 (b), where node 16 is
the destination, and 9 is the observer. In both pictures, the observing node only shares 40% or less
of the total information about the observed destination node at any sampling period.
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Figure 14: Traffic Entropy in Different Sampling Periods (Multiple Observers, γ = 1.85)
This observation is further confirmed in Fig. 14, where we plot the time-variant mutual infor-
mation that destinations 1 and 16 share with other randomly-chosen observing nodes. These results
show that with our algorithm, the destination node is able to consistently limit the proportion of
mutual information it shares with the observing nodes.
Which Nodes have more Mutual Information?
In Fig. 15 (a), we calculate the time-averaged mutual information for all observing nodes with
respect to the destination node 1. (The nodes are sorted in ascending order.) Here, we observe an
almost linearly-growing curve except at its head and tail. For nodes at the head of the cure, their
mutual information is 0 since they lie at the outer rim of the network. Hence, they are not chosen
by our routing algorithm to relay traffic for node 1. At the tail of the curve is destination node 1,
whose mutual information is actually the traffic entropy of its own. In Fig. 15 (b), we observe the
same phenomenon for destination 16, except at the head of the curve. This is because its network
location is opposite to the gateway, making every node of the network to be its candidate relaying
node.
This leads us to investigate whether such distribution of mutual information is related with
other factors. We considered the mutual information of each node with certain metrics, such as its
distance to the destination. However, we failed to find any causal relationship. We also considered
sorting the observation nodes based on their averaged relayed traffic (i.e., the average number
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(a) Destination: Node 1 (γ = 1.85) (b) Destination: Node 16 (γ = 1.85)
Figure 15: Sorted Traffic Mutual Information
of packets that each node relays in a sampling period) on a log-log scale. We found a linear
distribution as shown in Fig. 16.
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Figure 16: Power-law Correlation of Mutual Information and Amount of Traffic Relayed
Obviously, such a power-law correlation tells us that the more traffic an observing node relays
for a destination node, the more mutual information can be obtained about its traffic entropy.
Furthermore, it gives us one way to experimentally quantify the relationship of these two metrics.
Let T be the amount of traffic relayed and I be the mutual information, then their power-law
relationship can be written as
I = aT k (10)
where a is the constant of proportionality and k is the exponent of the power law, both of which can
be measured from Fig. 16. If k < 1, then the mutual information of an observing node grows in a
sub-linear fashion to the amount of its relayed traffic increases. If k ≥ 1, this mutual information
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grows in a super-linear fashion. From Fig. 16 and the same results for other destination nodes, we
have k < 1. This implies that an observing node has to relay more and more traffic each time, in
order to make its mutual information further grow with the same increment.
Trade-off between Performance Degradation and Traffic Privacy
Finally, we study the performance trade-off of our algorithm by tuning its exponential penalty
function base γ. The performance degradation introduced by our algorithm is captured by the
average hop ratio. For each gateway-destination pair g − x, this metric is defined as the ratio
between the average number of hops a packet goes through using our algorithm and the number
of hops of the shortest path between g and s. From Fig. 17, we can see that the average hop ratio
increases as γ increases. The direct neighbors of the gateway are less sensitive to the change of γ.
(See node 6 in Fig. 17(a) and node 23 in Fig. 17(b).)
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Figure 17: Average Hop Ratio
In Fig. 18 and Fig. 19 we find that, under shortest path routing, the mutual information of a
node is 0 if it is not on the path to the destination node. Otherwise, the mutual information of a
node is much higher than when using the new algorithm. Also worth noting is the observation
that increasing γ has different impact on different nodes, depending on its distance to gateway,
destination, and its location in the WMN. Consider node 12 (Fig. 18) and 6 (Fig. 19). Since they
lie near the gateway node and are relatively centrally situated, their observed mutual information
varies little with respect to changes of γ. In contrast, for node 22 (Fig. 18), which is far away
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from destination node 1 and on edge of WMN. The mutual information shared between itself and
node 1 increases with the growth of γ, indicating more traffic is routed through farther nodes. This
tendency of routing packets via farther nodes leads to a higher average number of hops, which is
confirmed by our analysis of the average hop ratio.
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Figure 18: Traffic Mutual Information under Different Penalty Parameters (Destination: Node 1)
However, traffic mutual information tends to decrease once γ gets too high (2.59 in Fig. 18).
This is due to the fact that when penalty values of many possible edges get large quickly, their
relative differences become less. Consequently, the number of candidate paths decreases. The
fluctuation of node 26 (Fig. 18) is due to its position in center of the topology and being equi-
distance between the gateway and destination nodes. Similar observations can be made about the
mutual information values of destination node 16 (Fig. 19).
We observe from Fig. 20 that the algorithm achieves our goal of preserving traffic patterns. It
is easy to conclude that in normal shortest path routing, all relaying nodes share the same traffic
information with the destination node, as shown by the tail of the ShortestPath curve in Fig. 20.
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(c) Observer: Node 14 (d) Observer: Node 19
Figure 19: Traffic Mutual Information under Different Penalty Parameters (Destination: Node 16)
However, for our algorithm, the mutual information shared between relaying nodes and the desti-
nation node varies less among the relaying nodes. As γ increases, the more leveled off the curve
becomes, and the closer we are to the goal of minimizing the greatest mutual information, as for-
mulated in Eq. 9. It is also interesting to observe that the mutual information is 0 for some nodes far
away from both the gateway and the destination nodes, e.g., Fig. 20 (a), when destination is 1. In
contrast, all nodes participate in relaying packets for destination 16 (Fig. 20 (b)), since destination
and gateway nodes are in opposite directions with respect to WMN topology.
Collusion Analysis
The relative small size of a typical WMN makes it easy for spatially close eavesdroppers to
find each other. This is concerning since there is a higher possibility of collusion of two malicious
observers by exchanging their observed traffic patterns. This motivates us to make our proposed
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Figure 20: Sorted Traffic Mutual Information under Different Penalty Parameters
solution resilient to such collusion threats. To analyze the extent to which collusion reveals infor-
mation about the original traffic pattern, we study the fluctuation of the observed traffic informa-
tion. In this way, we can analyze how much additional information the colluders can collect about
the original traffic.
Problem Description
In the first part of this chapter we focused on traffic confidentiality. We studied the problem
of traffic pattern concealment via routing control. However, the relative small size of a WMN,
aided by the stationary adjacent routers, invites a higher possibility of collusion between several
observing relaying routers in the network. Since it is highly possible that different observers will
know about various “ups and downs” of target’s traffic, if malicious observers interchange their
observed traffic information of target users, the combined observations could reveal significant
information about the original traffic pattern. This is illustrated in Fig. 21. Given the size of
the network (e.g., less than 100 neighbor nodes), we think it is more common that less than two
malicious observers exist simultaneously. Hence we focus on analyzing the collusion problem of
two observers in this work.
The parameters that affect significantly our collusion analysis include the choice of cooperating
observers and the destination target node. Since any routing algorithm will largely depend on the
topology of the network and the relative positions of the observers, the source and destination
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Figure 21: Collusion Reveals Significant Portion of Original Traffic Pattern.
nodes can affect portions of the revealed traffic pattern greatly. Another important parameter is the
base of the exponential penalty function explained in Sec. III.
Colluded Traffic Mutual Information
Our modeling of colluded traffic analysis tries to study the influence of collusion to observed
traffic patterns of every period. This can help us to evaluate the resilience of our proposed PBSP
routing algorithm against collusion attack. In what follows, we consider three nodes x, y, and z.
x is the destination node of the traffic from the gateway g to x. Nodes y and z are the observing
nodes, which relay packets for x, and also try to analyze the traffic of x. Due to the uncertainty of
routing, y and z may or may not be on the same path over time.
Initially, we identify a metric to capture colluded observations. Based on definition of traffic
mutual information defined in Sec. III, we measure the colluded observation about destination x
with mutual information between x and (y, z). The traffic observations by y and z together can
be deemed as a joint distribution of variable Y X and ZX . The colluded traffic mutual information
I(Y X , ZX ;X) of random variable (Y X , ZX) with respect to X can then be defined as
I(Y X , ZX ;X) = H(Y X , ZX) +H(X)−H(Y X , ZX , X) (11)
where H(Y X , ZX , X) is the joint entropy of Y X , ZX , and X . I(Y X , ZX ;X) represents the
information gained about X from (Y X , ZX) (i.e., from y and z acting together). Their relationship
is shown in Fig. 22.
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Table 4: Notations used in Sec. III.
V wireless node set
E edge set
g gateway node
x destination node
y, z observing nodes
X random variable describing x’s traffic pattern
Y X , ZX random variables describing x’s traffic pattern observed by y
and z, separately
(Y X , ZX) random variable describing x’s traffic pattern observed by y
and z together
H(X) entropy of X
H(Y X) entropy of Y X
H(Y X , ZX , X) joint entropy of Y X , ZX , and X
I(Y X ;X) mutual information between X and Y X
I(Y X , ZX ;X) colluded mutual information between X and (Y X , ZX)
Figure 22: I(Y X , ZX ;X), H(Y X , ZX) and H(Y X , ZX , X) in Venn Diagram.
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Simulation Results
For ease of notation in the following discussion, we use H(Y,X) to denote H(Y X , X) (i.e.,
the entropy of traffic that y observes about x). Similarly, we simplify the joint traffic entropy
H(Y X , ZX) asH(y, z, x), where Y X , ZX denote the portions of traffic that Y and Z observe about
X . In a subtly different way, we denote I(Y X ;X) as I(Y ;X) and I(Y X , ZX ;X) as I(Y, Z;X).
Traffic Curves
We first present the measured traffic curves as a function of time. In Fig. 23, node 1 is the
destination node. We easily conclude that its traffic (i.e., node 1 observing itself) is always the
largest. This is because any node can observe the complete traffic of itself while other nodes can
only observe a portion of it.
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Figure 23: Sampled Traffic Curves from Experiment.
Another observation is the fact that the colluded knowledge about traffic activity of node 1 (in
squares), as expected, is higher than any single observer, either node 15 or node 28. Moreover, we
confirm that, although, generally speaking, node 15 observes much more traffic of node 1, during
some intervals, node 28 out-performs node 15, which increases the aggregated knowledge about
node 1’s total traffic activity. Example intervals are those near interval 100 and 150.
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Colluded Traffic Mutual Information: Single Pair of Observers
The next results are the comparisons of colluded traffic mutual information (I(y, z;x)), single
observer mutual information (I(y;x) and I(z;x)), original traffic entropy (H(x)), separately ob-
served traffic entropy (H(y, x) and H(z, x)) and joint entropy (H(y, z, x)).4 From our analysis in
Sec. III, we conclude the following relationships among these values:
1. H(y, x), H(z, x) ≤ H(y, z, x) ≤ H(x);
2. I(y, x), I(z, x) ≤ I(y, z, x) ≤ H(x);
3. I(y, x) ≤ H(y, x) ≤ H(x);
4. I(z, x) ≤ H(z, x) ≤ H(x);
We can verify that the simulation results shown in Fig. 24 satisfy these relationships. This
means our modeling of traffic activity not only characterizes the traffic pattern fluctuation across
the time, but it also actually illustrates the collusion problem. The simulation results of our model
conforms to our conjectures.
The overlapping curves in Fig. 24(b) indicates that node 23 does not observe any traffic of node
1. This is true since nodes 23 and 1 are on opposite sides of the network. Fig. 25 shows similar
results, where node 16 is the destination.
Colluded Traffic Mutual Information: Multiple Pairs of Observers
The simulation results confirm the necessary relationships listed previously. We now analyze
how collusion affects the performance of Penalty-based Shortest Path (PBSP) routing. To accom-
plish this, we study the colluded traffic mutual information of several pairs of observers. In this
way, we compare the ratio of traffic information collected by different pairs of observers.
From Fig. 26 we observe that the conditions listed above still hold. Additionally, based on the
average values of the colluded traffic mutual information curves in both figures, we infer that the
4Please note that H(y, z, x), according to our notation, means H(Y X , ZX).
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Figure 24: Colluded Traffic Mutual Information (Destination: 1, γ = 1.85).
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Figure 25: Colluded Traffic Mutual Information (Destination: 16, γ = 1.85).
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Figure 26: Colluded Traffic Mutual Information (Multiple Pairs of Observers, γ = 1.85).
PBSP algorithm works well when there are two observers colluding to share their knowledge about
one destination.
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(a) destination: 1, observers: 15, 6, 4 (b) destination: 16, observers: 15, 6, 4
Figure 27: Colluded Traffic Mutual Information (Multiple Pairs of Observers, γ = 1.85).
To further confirm this conjecture, we examine another set of simulation results, as shown in
Fig. 27. The colluded traffic mutual information of all observer pairs in this figure does not exceed
half of the total traffic information. In Fig. 27(b), however, we notice some small error in the curves
(i.e., the value of I(15, 6; 16) is slightly less than that of I(15; 16) for period 2). Although this is
a small error, it is similar to approximation error when computing H(Y X , ZX , X). Instead of
employing three parallel PacketCounters to get the aggregate traffic information, the simulation
program approximates it, based on the packet count value dictionary, which results in a lower
I(Y X , ZX ;X) value.
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The same explanation applies to the discrepancy in Fig. 28(a). The average value of colluded
traffic mutual information of all observer pairs in Fig. 28 remains approximately less than half of
the total traffic entropy of the target node across all time periods.
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(a) destination: 1, observers: 21, 15, 7 (b) destination: 16, observers: 21, 15, 7
Figure 28: Colluded Traffic Mutual Information (Multiple Pairs of Observers, γ = 1.85).
Related Work
Multi-hop wireless mesh networks (WMN) are gaining popularity. Current deployments of
WMN either serve as substitutes for traditional WLAN Internet connections, or aim at providing
infrastructural large-scale network access [45].
Existing research [6, 32, 14, 11] on WMN has focused on how to better utilize the wireless
channel resource and enhance its performance. For example, some researchers derive the optimal
node density following a capacity analysis [28], while others devise more efficient [18] protocols.
A survey paper by Akyildiz et al. [10] provides a good source for existing and ongoing research
about wireless mesh networks. Some of the proposed solutions include equipping mesh routers
with multiple radios and distributing the wireless backbone traffic over different wireless channels,
routing the traffic through different paths [22, 57], or a joint solution of these two [47, 46]. Theo-
retical studies show that these approaches can significantly increase the capacity of WMN [36, 34].
These results make significant steps towards enabling WMN as an attractive alternative for broad-
band Internet access.
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Information Theory is widely used and proves to be a useful tool. It applies to situations
where variations are frequent and unpredictable. It also helps to identify patterns and the extent
of observed variations. Serjantov et al. [51] define an information theoretic anonymity metric and
suggest developing more sophisticated probabilistic anonymity metrics. Existing research in the
Internet setting employs information theoretical coding [33]. However, such analysis is often too
complex and impractical for WMNs. The book by David Mackay provides a good source for
background knowledge in information theory [40].
Privacy has been a major concern of Internet users [17, 55]. Two types of techniques have been
proposed to preserve user traffic privacy and increase the difficulty for performing harmful traffic
analysis [48, 13] in the existing literature of traffic pattern concealment. They are anonymous over-
lay routing [59, 13, 26, 33, 27, 21, 49] and traffic padding [52]. The former approach provides user
anonymity in an end-to-end connection through layered encryption and multi-hop overlay routing.
The latter one conceals the traffic shape by generating a continuous random data stream at the link
level. However neither approach is applicable to WMN directly. First, the number of nodes in
a WMN is limited. Second, the traffic forwarding relationship among nodes is strongly depen-
dent on their locations and the network topology. To better utilize the wireless channel resource
and enhance the data delivery performance, a shortest path routing technique is usually selected
(or a load-balanced routing scheme is employed). Such observations indicate that the anonymity
systems, which rely on relaying traffic among nodes (randomly selected out of thousands) to gain
anonymity, can not effectively preserve users’ privacy in WMN (or at the cost of significant per-
formance degradation). On the other hand, traffic padding mechanisms consume a considerable
amount of network bandwidth, which makes it impractical in resource-constrained WMNs.
The schemes designed for wireless ad-hoc networks [56, 15] are more focused on location and
identity privacy. While these are still issues in WMN, the traffic rates and temporal variations are
more meaningful and consequential. To the best of our knowledge, no existing work has studied
collusion problems about traffic privacy in the scenario of Wireless Mesh Networks.
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Conclusion
This chapter identifies the problem of traffic privacy preservation in wireless mesh networks
(WMN). To address this problem, we introduced a light-weight architecture for WMN, then pro-
posed “traffic entropy”, an information theoretic metric to quantify how well a solution performs
at preserving traffic pattern confidentiality. A new penalty-based shortest path routing algorithm
was described and analyzed. We evaluated our scheme in the presence of two malicious colluding
nodes. Simulation results show that our algorithm is able to preserve traffic privacy, while min-
imizing the network performance degradation within acceptable ranges. Our simulation analysis
demonstrate the resilience of our solution against two colluding observers.
For future work, we will focus on the following problems. First, although our algorithm is
evaluated in a single-radio, single-channel WMN setting, it can be easily enhanced to exploit the
advantages of multiple radios and multiple channels available in WMNs. Performance evaluation
of the enhanced algorithm in such settings should provide interesting results. It is also beneficial
to evaluate the possibility of devising a distributed routing algorithm that achieves the same goal
but which supports better scalability.
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CHAPTER IV
PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Preserving information confidentiality is a critical issue for wireless sensor networks. While
existing security solutions (e.g., encryption) could protect the data content, they can not protect
against direction-based traffic analysis. Preserving directional traffic privacy is a challenging prob-
lem for wireless sensor networks, as the conventional approaches such as traffic padding and rout-
ing control are usually very resource-consuming. This chapter investigates the effectiveness of
privacy preserving mechanisms and seeks an optimal solution for preserving privacy in a resource-
constrained environment. It presents a novel privacy model that characterizes the application-
specific impact of pattern revelation. Via this privacy model, the privacy preservation problem
is formulated as an optimization-problem, where optimal routing schemes are derived. Through
theoretical analysis and simulation validation, we evaluate the performance of the optimal pri-
vacy preservation routing scheme and demonstrate its trade-off in privacy preservation and routing
efficiency.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks are formed by a collection of sensor devices which are capable of
sensing, data processing, and communicating via wireless medium [29]. They can be readily
deployed in diverse environments to collect and process useful information in an autonomous
manner. Thus, they have a wide range of applications in the areas of health care, military, and
disaster detection. Sensor networks are envisioned to change the way people interact with the
physical environment and to have a significant social impact.
One of the most notable challenges that threaten successful deployment of sensor networks is
the protection of information privacy. The challenge comes from two characteristics of wireless
sensor networks: (1) open wireless medium prone to eavesdropping;and (2) sensors prone to phys-
ical capture, which make it vulnerable to a variety of attacks. For a sensor network that provides
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surveillance service, information communicated within the sensor networks involves when and
where an event happens, and what is the event. This defines two types of information privacy –
the contextual privacy (when and where) and the content-wise privacy (what) [30]. It is obvious
that the content-wise privacy is a critical issue for sensor networks. The contextual information,
however, also reveals important information with respect to the sensor network operation. In an
event-driven sensor network, where messages are only generated and sent upon the detection of
certain event, the attackers can easily infer the contextual information (location and time of the
event) by observing the traffic patterns.
Content-wise privacy is most often protected via message encryption. In the existing literature,
the security mechanisms that support the content-wise privacy has been extensively researched
(e.g., link-level security solution [31], key distribution [23]). Only limited work, however, has
been done on the contextual privacy issues associated with sensor communication. The work of
[30], one of the first works on contextual privacy, has studied protecting location information (so
called location privacy). In this work, the authors study a sensor network application scenario
of panda hunting. They define location privacy and provide a privacy preservation solution via
controlled random routing and flooding. Though the work of [30] provides a convincing solution
and makes an important step towards location privacy, two major issues in the area of contextual
privacy:
• Lack of a precise definition of contextual privacy which is generalizeable into different ap-
plication scenarios.
• Lack of an analytical model that balances resource requirements of privacy preservation
solutions and their effectiveness. Many of the contextual privacy preservation approaches,
such as traffic padding and routing control, are quite resource-consuming. For resource-
constrained sensor networks, it is important to carefully examine the resource requirements
of these solutions and provide a tuning mechanism can trade-off effectiveness against re-
source requirements.
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To address the above issues, this chapter presents an optimization-based theoretical framework
that characterizes the effectiveness of privacy preserving mechanisms. Our definition of privacy is
general and can be customized to application-specific scenarios. We focus on the location privacy
issue in wireless sensor networks in this work.
The chapter seeks an optimal solution for preserving privacy in a resource-constrained environ-
ment. It presents a novel privacy model based on an attacker penalty function, which characterizes
the application-specific impact of pattern revelation. Via this privacy model, the privacy preser-
vation problem is formulated as an optimization problem where the optimal routing schemes are
derived. Through theoretical analysis and simulation validation, we show several important prop-
erties of the optimal privacy preservation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. IV presents the attacker and privacy
models. These models are used further in Sec. IV to formulate privacy preservation as an optimiza-
tion problem. Sec. IV.[TODO] The simulation results are provided in Sec. IV demonstrates how
an optimal routing protocol can be designed to have good trade-off between privacy preservation
and network performance. A review of the existing literature is provided in Sec. IV. We present
conclusions in Sec. IV.
Model
Sensor Network Model
We consider an event-driven sensor network with a set of sensor nodes n ∈ N as shown
in Fig. 29. The event set E = {e} denotes the set of all possible events in this network. In
this chapter, we focus on the events that are characterized by their geographical locations. For
example, in the dirty bomb detection and localization scenario [3], the static sensors are deployed
around a stadium to report position data about the moving node. Let E be the random variable
that represents the detected event in the sensor network. Then the probability that this event is e is
denoted as Pr(E = e), or in abbreviation Pr(e).
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attacker
Event e
observation d
Figure 29: Example Sensor Network.
When an event e is detected in the sensor network, the sensors that detect the event will send
messages among themselves and/or to the data sink. We assume that the confidentiality and in-
tegrity of the message content are protected via data encryption and message authentication code.
If source routing is used in the network, then the source route information carried in the packet
header is also protected.
Attacker Model
The attacker tries to infer the event occurred in the sensor network based on his observations.
Since the packets are encrypted, the attackers could only do so by observing the traffic patterns
(e.g., from which direction packets are coming). Depending on the observation location(s) of the
attacker and his observation range, different observations may be made for a single event. Without
loss of generality, we assume that an attacker has a fixed set of observation locations and ranges
when observing a single event. Thus, for an event e, there is only one possible observation d for a
particular attacker. Let us denote the set of all possible observations from attacker A upon different
events as DA. We further denote the set of all possible observations from different attackers with
different locations and observation ranges as D =
⋃
ADA.
Upon observing d ∈ DA, the attacker A may infer a set of possible events E˜ = {e˜}, and take
some corresponding actions. For example, he may deduce that the dirty bomb needs to be moved
to a new position. If the real event that occurs is e, then we model the utility of the attacker by
inferring event e˜ via an attacker pay-off function S(e˜, e). A positive value of S(e˜, e) indicates the
gain of the attacker when his inferred event is equal to (or close to) the true event; while a negative
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value represents the penalty to the attacker if his inference is far away from the true event. Here
we give several examples to illustrate the concept of the pay-off function S(e˜, e).
Example 1.
S(e˜, e) =


1 if e˜ = e;
−1 otherwise.
(12)
In this example, the attacker will get a pay-off value of 1 if his inferred event e˜ is the true event e.
Otherwise, the pay-off is −1, which reflects the penalty on him to react to the wrong events.
Example 2.
S(e˜, e) = F (|le˜, le|) (13)
where le˜ and le are the locations of events e˜ and e, and |le˜, le| is the distance between these two
locations. In this example, the events are identified by their locations. The attacker’s pay-off
depends on the distance between the inferred event e˜ and the true event e. The function F (·) could
take different shapes which reflect different degrees of sensitivity of revealing the event location to
the attacker. See Fig. 30. In this figure, the convex curve represents that an attacker is sensitive to
event location revelation.
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Figure 30: Example Penalty Functions of Different Sensitivity to Event Location Revelation.
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When the true event is e, the total pay-off S for the attacker from inferring and reacting to event
set E˜ is
S(e, E˜) =
∑
e˜∈E˜
S(e˜, e) (14)
It is obvious that the optimal strategy of a rational attacker is to infer and react to the event set E˜
so that his total pay-off is maximized, implying:
max
E˜
∑
e˜∈E˜
S(e˜, e) (15)
Without knowing the true event e, the attacker determines his strategy by estimating his total
pay-off Sˆ based on his observation d. The estimation is done through the relation between an
event and the possible observations by the attacker. Let Pr(e|d) be the probability of event e’s
occurrence if d is observed. Then, the attacker’s pay-off Sˆ of inference set E˜ based on observation
d is estimated as
Sˆ(d, e, E˜) =
∑
e∈E
{Pr(e|d)×
∑
e˜∈E˜
S(e˜, e)} (16)
Thus the attacker’s optimal strategy is to derive E˜ so that Sˆ is maximized. To do that, he first
needs to estimate Pr(e|d). Note that some events in the sensor network may not be observable by
attacker A, depending on his observation location and range. We denote the set of events that could
be observed by A as EA. Obviously, ∀e /∈ EA, P r(e|d) = 0. For an event observable by attacker
A, we use PrA(e) to denote the probability that this event is e, where e ∈ EA. For an observation
by attacker A, we use PrA(d) to denote the probability that this event is d, where d ∈ DA. Based
on Bayes’ theorem, we have
Pr(e|d) =
Pr(d|e)× PrA(e)
PrA(d)
(17)
where Pr(d|e) is the probability that event e triggers observation d. We assume that attacker A
knows PrA(e) for all e ∈ EA as a priori knowledge of the sensor network. The attacker could
further derive PrA(d) for all d ∈ DA based on his observation. Pr(d|e) depends on the attacker’s
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observation location and range, as well as how the event-driven messages are routed in the network.
We assume that the attacker is able to estimate Pr(d|e) based on his knowledge of message routing
mechanisms in the sensor network. We will discuss the details of such estimations in the next
section.
The pay-off J(E˜) for attacker A can be expressed as:
J(E˜) =
∑
e∈EA
{
Pr(d|e)× PrA(e)
PrA(d)
∑
e˜∈E˜
S(e˜, e)} (18)
Then, the attacker’s strategy is formulated as
A : maximize J(E˜) (19)
where E˜ ⊆ EA
Given observation d, the knowledge of Pr(d|e), PrA(e) and attacker penalty function S(e˜, e), the
optimal strategy of attacker A is denoted as E˜∗A(d), which leads to the optimal attacker pay-off as
J∗A(d). The property of E˜∗A(d) is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1, Given observation d ∈ DA, the knowledge of Pr(d|e), PrA(e), and the attacker
penalty function S(e˜, e), the inferred event set E˜∗A(d) is the optimal strategy for attacker A if and
only if ∀e˜ ∈ E˜∗A(d), ∑
e∈E
Pr(d&e)× S(e˜, e) > 0 (20)
where Pr(d&e) is the probability that both d and e occur when an observation is made by attacker
A.
Proof: Note that
∑
e∈EA
{
Pr(d|e)× PrA(e)
PrA(d)
∑
e˜∈E˜
S(e˜, e)} (21)
=
1
PrA(d)
∑
e˜∈E˜
∑
e∈EA
Pr(d|e)× PrA(e)× S(e˜, e)
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Since
∑
e∈EA
Pr(d|e) × PrA(e) × S(e˜, e) are independent for different e˜s, to maximize Eq. (21),
an event e˜ ∈ EA should be included in the set E˜∗A if and only if
∑
e∈E
Pr(d|e)× PrA(e)× S(e˜, e) > 0 (22)
which leads to the result.
Privacy Model
From the above discussions, the pay-off of an attacker indicates the importance of the infor-
mation revealed to him. Thus it also reflects the value of the contextual information. The goal of
privacy preservation is to minimize the pay-offs of all attackers. Formally, let A be the set of at-
tackers, where each attacker is identified by his location and observation range. Further let Pr(A)
be the probability of attacker A’s appearance. We define a contextual privacy index P of a sensor
network as follows.
P =
∑
A∈A
Pr(A)
∑
d∈DA
PrA(d)× J
∗
A(d) (23)
The privacy preservation goal is to minimize P . In order to achieve this goal, the sensor
network design controls the distribution of Pr(d|e),∀A, via different message routing schemes.
Formally, the optimal strategy of E˜∗A is a function of the attacker’s pay-off function S, and condi-
tional probability vector Pr(dA|eA), eA ∈ EA. The optimal aggregated pay-off of attacker A upon
observing dA is J∗. Given the distribution of eA and dA, J∗ is a function of the attacker’s pay-off
function S, and the vector Pr(dA|eA), eA ∈ EA. Formally,
J∗(S, PdA) =
∑
eA∈EA
{
PdA(eA)× Pr(eA)
Pr(dA)
∑
e˜∈E˜∗
S(e˜, eA)} (24)
It is the routing protocol designer’s goal to minimize J∗(S, PdA) for possible attackers As.
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Optimal Location Privacy Preservation
The “sense and aggregate” operation mode makes wireless sensor networks vulnerable to direc-
tion based traffic analysis. Fig. 31 illustrates how an attacker can trace an event back to its source
location by directional traffic analysis. When an event occurs, represented by a bell in Fig. 31, the
message about the event is sent out to the sink of the wireless sensor network. The attacker can
then trace back where the message source is by listening to the wireless channels, as shown with
reverse arrows. We give a formal description of the privacy preservation problem next.
Sink
Figure 31: Illustration of Directional Traffic Analysis.
Based on the privacy index defined in Section IV (i.e., Equation 23), we investigate privacy
preservation mechanisms that minimize the privacy index P . The design of privacy preservation
mechanisms depends on the attackers’ knowledge about the routing protocol and network topol-
ogy. Such information is often publicly available. Thus we will assume that the attacker is able
to know the real distribution of Pr(d|e) and Pr(e). Under this assumption, the protection mech-
anism controls Pr(d|e) (e.g., via routing) to minimize the privacy preservation. This problem is
formulated as follows:
min
Pr(d|e)
∑
d∈D
∑
e˜∈E˜∗
∑
e∈E
Pr(d|e)× Pr(e)× S(e˜, e, d) (25)
Intuitively, the best strategy for routing protocol designer is to maximize the uncertainty about
the source event when a particular observation is made about it. We link our formulation with
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the concept of information entropy from information theory as follows: when Pr(d|e) follows a
uniform distribution, the information entropy is maximized. This leads us to introduce random
walk routing to approximate more uniform distributed Pr(d|e).
Sink
Guess Angle
Routing Angle
Figure 32: Routing Angle and Guess Angle in Directed Random Walk Routing.
Practically, the routing protocol designer adopts a directed random walk routing to decide the
next hop during the routing stage. Directed random walk routing is controlled by the routing angle
(RA), which determines the set of sensors from which the next hop sensor is chosen. (The goal
of routing is to aggregate the information at the sink.) The attacker, according to our attacker
model, infers the possible sources for the related traffic he observes, based on a guess angle (GA).
The routing protocol designer seeks to minimize the privacy index by adjusting to the optimal
routing angle for a given network and typical traffic profile, given possible guess angles chosen by
attackers. Fig. 32 illustrates the routing angle and the guess angle.
Location Privacy Preservation Algorithms and Simulation
In this section, we discuss the algorithms and simulation environment that a routing protocol
designer can utilize to best preserve location privacy. We start with directed random walk routing
algorithm. A simulation procedure is next described, from which a traffic log is obtained. By
analyzing this log, the real distribution of Pr(e) can be calculated when packets are routed under
a given routing angle. With continued observation about traffic, it is possible for the attackers to
know the real distribution of Pr(d|e) and Pr(e).
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A directed random walk routing algorithm aims at delivering packets to sensor network sink s
by repeatedly selecting neighbors within the range of specified routing angle. For every node i in
a sensor network, an angled-neighbor node list ANi is maintained by selecting nodes x from the
original neighbor node list NNi. These node xs are in the routing angle range from i to sink node
s. Mathematically, we have cos(routing angle) < d
2(i,x)+d2(i,s)−d2(x,s)
2d(i,x)d(i,s)
and ANi ⊂ NNi,∀i. (Here
d(x, y) denotes the distance between node x and node y.) In order to avoid indefinite walking when
applying the directed random walk routing algorithm, it is advisable to obtain a set PathSeti of
successful random paths Pathji beforehand for any possible event source i. These Path
j
i paths are
next used for source routing and are updated when routing angle changes. The paths in path sets
PathSetis are regenerated and updated on a regular basis for sensor node i.
We now describe the algorithm to generate a successful directed random walk (i.e., Pathji ),
from sensor node i to sensor network sink s. For every hop in the routing process, a next hop node
x is selected and compared to the sink s. If x is not the sink node and the total number of hops has
not exceeded length of the longest allowed path, the algorithm proceed to generate a new hop x′
and test again. This procedure is illustrated in Tab. 5.
Table 5: Directed Random Walk Routing Algorithm
/*Get jth random walk path from Snode to Dnode*/
DRWR(Snode,Dnode, j)
hopCnt← 0
curHop← Snode
Repeat
hopCnt← hopCnt+ 1
If hopCnt > maxCnt
Return FAIL
Put curHop to hopCntth position of PathjSnode
Randomly choose one node x from ANcurHop
curHop← x
Until curHop = Dnode
The above discussed algorithm can be applied in the sensor network simulation program. For
simplicity, we assume it is equally likely for an event to occur at any sensor nodes in a sensor
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network. Whenever an event e occurs at sensor i, a path Pathji is selected randomly from path
set PathSeti to route that message. Any sensor nodes y on the path Pathji will observe an event
occurrence. This observation is denoted as dy. If y is an attacker, it tries to infer out which sensor is
the source of the event. It will first identify the sensor nodes (Z = {z}) that are in the guess angle
as illustrated in Fig. 32. For every sensor z identified, a probability pz can be assigned to indicate
the likelihood that z being the source of observation dy. Depending on the attacker’s strategy, the
probability distribution of the zs can be either uniform or dependent on their distances (|ly, lz|) to
the observing position. The weighted pay-off Sdy of this single observation dy for y can then be
denoted as: Sdy =
∑
pzS(z, e). The individual pay-off values Sdy are next used to calculate the
per-path privacy index PI. In general, if y is a node on path Pathji , we can represent the probability
that y is the attacker when an attacker exists on Pathji as py. For any path Path
j
i , we have its
privacy index as P
Path
j
i
=
∑
pySdy .
After simulating the routing of messages for sufficient long time, we are able to collect a
running log recording the occurrences of all events, as well as the paths used to route the messages
to the sink s. By analyzing this log, we can obtain the distribution of probability pi for an event e
to occur at sensor i. With a given event source i, the probability that path Pathji is used to route
message can also be deduced. We represent it as pj . By now, we can define the aggregated sensor
network privacy index P under routing angle and guess angle as:
P =
∑
i
pi
∑
j
pjPPathji
(26)
By definition we know that Pr(e) defined in Sec. IV is pi here. Similarly, Pr(d|e) is an other way
of expressing pj and py.
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Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results of the algorithm discussed in previous section.
We simulate the traffic within a wireless sensor network consisting of 30 sensor nodes. Directed
random walk routing is used with different routing angles. The obtained logs are further analyzed
to calculate the privacy index under various guess angles. We evaluate the effectiveness of privacy
preservation and find the optimal routing angle while using directed random walk routing. The
pay-off function used is given in Example 1 in Sec. IV.
(a) GuessAngle=30 (b) GuessAngle=60
Figure 33: Privacy Index at Event Source Node.
Fig. 33 plots the privacy index when every individual node serves as the event source. The
absolute value of the privacy index when various nodes act as the source depends on the location
of the node in the network topology. From Fig. 33 (a) and (b), we infer that the average privacy
index tends to increase when the guess angle increases from 30 degrees to 60. This is due to the
fact that a larger guess angle leads to more candidate event sources when the attacker is collecting
observations. Therefore, it is more likely that the true source location is included in E˜ .
In order to find the optimal routing angle for a given traffic profile (e.g., when every node is
equally likely to be the event source), we calculate the average privacy index value for all possible
event sources, using different guess angles and various routing angles. The results are illustrated
in Fig. 34. We observe that the overall privacy index decreases as the routing angle increases. This
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Figure 34: Overall Network Privacy Index under Routing Angle and Guess Angle.
follows from the fact that larger routing angles result in increased randomness for directed random
walk routing, but with an associated increase in communication overhead.
From Fig. 34, we notice that the overall privacy index is relatively flat for routing angles less
than 100 degrees. We recall that larger routing angles lead to more randomness and to more
possible paths. This, in turn, leads to larger average path lengths. By balancing the trade-off
between privacy preservation and performance degrade (e.g., throughput, average response time),
we infer that , for directed random walk routing to function best, the optimal routing angle is
around 100 to 110 degrees in our simulation scenario.
Related Work
Wireless sensor networks have many potential applications in critical scenarios such as battle-
field surveillance, environmental monitoring and in-home health care. These missions are sensitive
to malicious attacks and demand security protection before large scale deployment of sensors is
possible. Security for wireless sensor networks has been studied in the existing literature [54],
which includes link layer security [31], broadcast authentication [44], and key management [24].
However, the privacy protection of source location [43, 37] is relatively new research in wireless
sensor networks. The paper [20] develops several countermeasures against traffic analysis seeking
to locate the source. In [30], the authors formally modeled the source location privacy problem in
wireless sensor networks. The routing characteristics of two types of random walk routing proto-
cols are examined. When the source locates in certain regions of the sensing field, the protocols
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in [30] suffer performance drop. To address it, [58] proposes self-adjusting directed random walk
routing.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the wireless sensor network (WSN) location privacy preservation prob-
lem. To address this problem, we quantify the attacker event source guessing pay-offs. Such
metrics are accumulated for all possible attackers and guess angles. For various network traffic
profiles, we obtain an overall privacy index. This leads to an optimization problem to find the
best routing angle, considering the trade-off between privacy and performance (i.e., throughput).
We evaluate directed random walk routing schemes under different routing angles by comparing
values of our proposed metric via simulation. The result suggests that an optimal routing angle can
be found and used in routing protocol design.
For future work, more measurements about privacy and performance trade-off are needed.
This includes identifying the inter-relationship of the two with respect to end users and network
designers.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we discuss the privacy demands arising from emerging composite wireless net-
works. Such privacy demands are multi-faceted and reveal important personal and private informa-
tion if not properly protected. We classify information privacy to two different types: content-wise
privacy and contextual privacy. For content-wise privacy, we adjust and improve the existing tools
and solutions for a particular type of privacy protection. For contextual privacy, we propose our
own ways to protect it.
By extending existing DRM tools, protection of content-wise data privacy is improved for
large scale data distribution. Contextual data privacy is an important issue and is vulnerable to two
types of threats: volume-based traffic analysis and direction based traffic analysis. Via simulation
experiments, we conclude that while routing control counters volume-based traffic analysis attacks,
routing protocol design is needed to protect against direction-based traffic analysis attacks.
As future work, a more general and uniform model of traffic analysis and contextual privacy is
needed. We also intend to explore the trade-off between privacy and performance by analyzing it
more formally.
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